Building the Plane We're Flying: Challenges and Opportunities in Louisiana Coastal Restoration by Crutcher, Morgan
 
BUILDING THE PLANE WE’RE FLYING: 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN LOUISIANA 


























A thesis submitted 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Science  
(School of Natural Resources and the Environment) 







Associate Professor Julia Wondolleck, Chair 








First and foremost, I would like to offer my sincere gratitude to the participants who gave 
me as little as 15 minutes to as many as three hours worth of memorable conversation. It 
helped define for me what it is to be a Louisianan if only adopted. The energy and the 
passion that came through these interviews only renewed my desire to return from the 
chilly clime of Michigan to feel the marsh between my toes.    
 
I would also like to thank my advisor, Julia Wondolleck, most of all for her patience but also 
her depth and breadth of insight into the collaborative process not to mention the process 
of writing a thesis. My appreciation goes out to Douglas Wilcox formerly of the USGS who is 
now living his dream at SUNY Brockport.  He maintained my sanity by serving as mentor and 
kept me in the marsh and exercising my GIS skills.  Thanks to David Katz for providing much 
needed support and encouragement and a more than occasional crack of the whip.        
 
Since the 1849 and 1850 Swamp Land Acts, the federal government has had a hand in 
cutting off sediment to coastal marshes and encouraging development of wetlands.  It has 
since reversed course by closing the MRGO, creating programs to take lands out of 
agricultural production returning them to wetlands, and potentially funding a coast-wide 
restoration and protection scheme costing somewhere in the billions of dollars.  There have 
been numerous strategies to restore coastal Louisiana and those efforts have become more 
serious over time however this is not just a state issue.  Louisiana wetland loss gained 
traction as a national issue on August 29th, 2005 with landfall of Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita.   Within three years after the storms national environmental advocacy organizations 
like the Environmental Defense Fund and the National Wildlife Federation set up office and 
established campaigns to fight the good fight.  Long time advocates of Louisiana wetlands 
wondered, “Is it too little, too late?” These two storms gave more advertising time to 
coastal Louisiana wetland loss than the America’s Wetland campaign ever could have 
afforded though perhaps not always with the desired consequences.  Many people simply 
wrote off coastal Louisiana as an unnecessary federal expense, without acknowledging the 
contributions and sacrifices that her people have made for the development of this 
nation—not unselfishly, many times unknowingly, and sometimes against our will.  Many 
states have destroyed and lost a greater percentage of wetlands than Louisiana.  We have 
kept what we have because they are our sustenance, our livelihood, our source of joy.  
Without waxing philosophic, we need these wetlands to continue to be who we are.  The 
nation needs them, because they keep prices down on fossil fuels, bulk commodities, and 
seafood. Good food and good music await those on vacation and are a staple of everyday 
life for those who live here.  The number one reason bringing tourists to the state is visiting 
with family and friends.  Perhaps the nation needs us to remember how to enjoy life.   
 
Appreciation and understanding has increased since the storm.  Perhaps that understanding 
and appreciation is waning as the memory of the storms distances itself, but there are 
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people who are constantly working on this issue, in fact almost an entire agency in addition 
to the numerous individuals working in the non-profit sector, etc., you know who you are.  
It is to those individuals that I dedicate this work.   
 
“It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man 
stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to 
the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, 
who strives valiantly; who errs and comes short again and again; because there is not 
effort without error and shortcomings; but who does actually strive to do the deed; who 
knows the great enthusiasm, the great devotion, who spends himself in a worthy cause, 
who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement and who at the worst, 
if he fails, at least he fails while daring greatly so that his place shall never be with those 
cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat.” 
 
Finally, my goal for this paper is to incite enthusiasm for the fascinating process taking place 
in state government right now and to illuminate opportunities for future studies examining 
these efforts. The more we examine this effort, the more we can improve upon it and hold 
our results to a higher standard.  This effort is not happening in a vacuum. Similar works are 
coevolving across the nation in the Sacramento-San Joaquin delta, in South Florida, in the 
Chesapeake Bay, in the Pacific Northwest on the Columbia River, the Great Lakes, and so 
on.  No where else in the country are the rewards so tangible, so visceral as right here in 
coastal Louisiana, whether to down the bayou Cajuns or cosmopolitan Creoles.     
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In response to significant wetland loss and damage to the hurricane protection system 
occurring in the 2005 hurricane season, the Louisiana legislature directed the Department 
of Natural Resources (DNR), responsible for coastal restoration, to work in partnership with 
the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), responsible for hurricane 
protection or levee building, to create a master plan to conserve, restore, and protect the 
coastline.  This newly introduced collaborative dynamic, the Coastal Protection and 
Restoration Authority (CPRA) and its implementing arm the Office of Coastal Protection and 
Restoration (OCPR) is consistent with a trend in large-scale ecosystem governance.  Fifteen 
key informants from six different perspectives -- levee districts, DNR, DOTD, Governor’s 
Office of Coastal Activities, University Scientists, and state legislators – were interviewed for 
this study in order to answer two overarching questions.  First, how is the CPRA unique?  
Second, what challenges and opportunities face it?  
 
The initiating crisis provided the conditions necessary for policy entrepreneurs to overcome 
previous barriers to collaboration and reinvigorate state led comprehensive coastal 
planning.   Further, crisis drew national attention which in turn created national support.  
Top-down executive level leadership at the state level facilitated an increase in coordination 
between multiple levels of government.  The newly established  OCPR, not yet operating at 
full capacity, has the potential to build capabilities in planning and management of 
restoration and protection features that rival if not supersede the work of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers.  Funding constraints tie state activity firmly to the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers and the congressional funding process through the Water Resources 
Development Act.  Challenging the continued success of the organization is the state’s 
ability to maintain focus and momentum over time in face of changing administrations both 
nationally and at the state level, short memory of the public and special interests, as well as 










“Crisis:  an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which a decisive 
change is impending; especially one with the distinct possibility of a highly 
undesirable outcome.”  —Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 
 
“We are living in an historic moment, one that presents us with a stark 
choice: whether to make the bold and difficult decisions that will preserve our 
state’s future, or cling to the status quo and allow coastal Louisiana and its 
communities to wash away before our eyes.”  —Master Plan, 2007  
 
Headlines read  “Drowning…the Delta,” “Losing Ground,” “Vanishing Coast,” 
“Washing Away,” and “Gone with the Water;” pithy sound bites describing the state of 
“Losing Louisiana,” (Blum & Roberts, 2009; Bourne Jr., 2004; Public Broadcasting System, 
2002; Schleifstein, 2002; Yeoman, 2010).  Is this sensationalism merited? Louisiana’s 
wetlands, or America’s Wetlands as they are billed by the failed public relations 
organization of the same name, are disappearing at an alarming rate (Miller & Holloway, 
2006).  Literature on Louisiana coastal wetland loss inevitably cites startling statistics 
describing an ecosystem on the brink of collapse.  
From 1932 to 2010 Louisiana lost a total of 1,883 square miles of coastal wetlands, 
approximately a quarter of wetlands existing in 1932 (Couvillion et al., 2011).  Land loss 
rates have varied over time.  From 1956 to 1974, land loss rate averaged upwards of 42 
square miles per year (Britsch & Dunbar, 1993).  From 1983 to 1990 the rate slowed to a 
brisk 25 square miles per year (Britsch & Dunbar, 1993).  From 1985 to 2010 coastal wetland 
loss slowed to around 16.57 square miles per year or a football field every hour (Couvillion 
et al., 2011).  
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This trend is not yet a claim for victory.  The most important process that builds and 
maintains marsh, deposition of Mississippi River sediment loads into the coastal area, has 
been hampered by the combination of two factors: the amount of sediment loads in the 
river and the ability of these loads to reach the coastal area.  Damming in the Upper 
Mississippi River Basin has caused a significant reduction of Mississippi River sediment 
loads.  Downriver, leveeing the channel for purposes of flood control and navigation 
prevents much of this sediment from reaching existing marsh, sending some of these loads 
past the continental shelf into the abyss of the Gulf of Mexico (Blum & Roberts, 2009; Kesel, 
1989).  Damming upriver is entirely outside of Louisiana’s authority.   Reconnecting 
sediment pathways downriver can be a contentious endeavor due to the many different 
conflicting interests affected.     
Coastal wetlands are not only important for the economy they create, but for the 
economy they protect.  Coastal wetlands in Louisiana protect vital shipping and energy 
infrastructure as well as support robust commercial, sport, and subsistence fisheries.  For 
every 2.7 miles of marsh, storm surge is reduced by one foot (Gedan, Kirwan, Wolanski, 
Barbier, & Silliman, 2010; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1963).  The actual variation in the 
relationship between marsh and storm surge is a function of multiple variables such as 
topography, shoreline geomorphology, soil type, and vegetative structure (Feagin, 2009; 
Gedan et al., 2010). Some scientists have questioned the importance of wetlands in coastal 
protection, arguing the relationship is tenuous at best because of these complex variables 
(Borrelli et al., 2007).  These uncertainties have some scientists and policy analysts calling 
for retreat from the coastline (Blum & Roberts, 2009; Kesel, 1989; Young, 2008). 
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Nevertheless, countries across the globe confronted with protecting their coastlines and 
major coastal cities from the threat of relative sea level rise (RSLR) and coastal storms have 
turned to constructing coastal wetlands as “bioshields” (Feagin et al., 2010; Gedan et al., 
2010).  At stake in Louisiana are two million lives, little less than half the state population, 
but more than half its gross domestic product.  
The issue of Louisiana coastal wetland loss gained national traction with the storms 
of the 2005 hurricane season. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were slow moving storms that 
built up storm surges as tall as thirty feet in some areas.   They exposed weaknesses in a 
hurricane protection system built across forty years, multiple generations of politicians, and 
engineers.  They created 217 square miles of open water, an area the equivalent to ten to 
fifteen years worth of land loss.  If decision-makers and coastal advocates thought they had 
“No Time to Lose” before the storm, the only way to describe the current situation was 
CRISIS (Burby et al., 1999). Louisiana wetlands were “hanging on by fingernails” ("Coastal 
Issues," 2007).  The accelerated land loss, displacement of people, death toll, and loss of 
property were all just a taste of what was to come if the state failed to counteract wetland 
loss and build sufficient hurricane protection.       
Since Louisiana’s first coastal management act was legislated in 1972 to regulate 
coastal activities, there has been some form of plan to regulate, protect, or restore the 
coastline. Each plan was assumed to be the most comprehensive or overarching plan to 
date until new information and initiative prompted a new plan which replaced, 
incorporated, and expanded upon its predecessor.  Causes of wetland loss were identified 
and agreed upon.  Some were outside of the state’s jurisdiction such as reduced sediment 
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load and others such as subsidence were beyond its control.  Some were simply too 
expensive.  Regardless, there remained a wealth of agreed upon techniques including but 
not limited to vegetative plantings, marsh terracing, backfilling of canals, and large-scale 
river diversions.   
Scientific consensus does not provide automatic policy solutions however.   One 
public university scientist summarized the scientific community’s perspective on the policy 
process in this way, “Louisiana has the technical expertise, and these experts are talking.   
Administratively we are not” ("Coastal Issues," 2007)  While there remain technical 
uncertainties in coastal restoration techniques and planning, significant political and 
process-oriented problems plague today’s efforts (Slaughter, 2007).  For example, there is 
serious doubt, if not complete confidence among many whether there is enough sediment 
in the river to restore the coast to any previous point in time (Blum & Roberts, 2009).  The 
question confronting decision-makers then is what and who to protect and to what extent.   
States are often limited in their capacity to address complex water resource issues 
by the sheer volume of data and technology involved, disjointed agency relationships, 
extrajurisdictional factors, and legal authority; however, they do possess a higher tolerance 
for experimentation, better understanding of the problem, more direct public 
accountability, and stronger local relationships than the feds (Hines & Smith, 1973; 
Stoerker, 1992).  Ultimately, it is the state that must and does take the lead in water 
resources management (Stoerker, 1992; Vigmostad, Mays, Hance, & Cangelosi, 2005).  To 
meet these challenges, states have looked to alternative forms of governance eschewing 
traditional methods of managing through agencies with discrete jurisdictions in favor of 
 5 
developing interagency collaborative capacity and public-private partnerships (Bardach, 
1998).    
Although collaborative forms of governance have been documented for decades 
(Bardach, 1998), their application across the nation to the restoration and management of 
large-scale ecosystems is novel and marked by the lack of a common vocabulary among 
researchers (Karkainnen, 2002).  Collaborative environmental governance and 
management, collaborative resource management, and co-management are all terms 
gaining use by researchers to describe a growing number of resource management regimes 
with several defining characteristics (Gunderson, Holling, & Light, 1995; Heikkila & Gerlak, 
2005; Karkainnen, 2002; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000).  These characteristics include an 
integrated system of management fitted to the natural system to be managed, an 
experimental nature providing for adjustment, and a hybrid public/private governance 
structure (Bardach, 1998; Gunderson et al., 1995; Karkainnen, 2002).  Notable examples of 
large-scale resource management collaboratives are the California Federal Bay Delta 
Program (CAL-FED), Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Program (CERP), Chesapeake 
Bay Program (CBP), and the Northwest Power and Conservation Council (NPCC) (Heikkila & 
Gerlak, 2005; Vigmostad et al., 2005).    
Such tailored large-scale ecosystem governance structures have arisen out of 
necessity as decision-makers recognize connections among resource uses and users across 
the landscape.   Yet, individuals within these efforts may see their efforts as novel, and their 
situations wholly unique (White, 2009).  Indeed, “novel ecosystems” resulting from altered 
hydrology, introduced species, and other human-induced changes across the landscape may 
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have no analog in the natural world (Hobbs, Hallett, Ehrlich, & Mooney, 2011).  This 
ecological novelty of the landscape and the threats to its integrity may then imbue novel or 
unique characteristics onto the management structure (Danter, Griest, Mullins, & Norland, 
2000; Light, Gunderson, & Holling, 1995; Robertson & Choi, 2010).  The driving force behind 
these changes, anthropogenic modification to the landscape, remains the same, and there 
is much that can be learned.  Challenges to one system, imply challenges to another.   “The 
winds of Hurricane Katrina have reached California—blowing out the flicker of confidence 
that officials had in the ability of…levees to withstand earthquakes, rising sea levels, and 
inevitable winter floods” (Little Hoover Commission, 2005).  Reducing the learning curve in 
implementing a successful restoration strategy, can save precious time and innumerable 
dollars dealing with the complexity of managing conflicting interests, ecological puzzles, and 
waiting on performance assessments (Vigmostad et al., 2005).  In the case of Louisiana 
where millions of lives and livelihoods are at stake with the threat of significant land loss, 
efforts to reduce the learning curve seem not only a matter of cost-efficiency but a matter 
of public safety.  
The newly created and little-examined Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration 
Authority (LCPRA, Brown Cunningham Gannuch, Shaw Environmnetal & Infrastructure, & 
Halcrow) is one of, if not the most recent attempt at collaborative environmental 
governance at the large-scale ecosystem level in the United States.  It is the result of both a 
continuing evolution towards collaborative governance and an urgent response to Crisis, 
specifically Hurricanes Katrina and Rita of 2005.  Full responsibility for conserving and 
protecting the lives of coastal inhabitants, the economy supported by coastal Louisiana, and 
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the very land itself lies solely with the CPRA.  The adequacy of funds, like the total cost of 
necessary projects, available to the CPRA is difficult to gauge and opinions vary.   There are 
many funding sources, both state and federal, few of which are fixed.   
The race to restore as many sustaining coastal processes as possible in the advance 
of climate change and a severely compromised system will not last long and efficiency is 
imperative. On many levels the state has made coastal restoration a priority and has 
emphasized urgency.  Executive Order #7 issued by Governor Bobby Jindal has made coastal 
restoration priority for every state agency, mandating that “all regulatory programs, 
contracts, grants and all other functions vested in them” be consistent with the master 
plan1. Governor-imposed expenditure and hiring freezes affect every department except the 
CPRA2.   In partnering with the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the CPRA is framing the 
work to be done as a “national emergency” in order to infuse collaboration between it and 
the Corps with a sense of urgency (Governor’s Advisory Commission, 2011).     
CPRA 
Act 8 of the 1st Extraordinary Session of the Louisiana Legislature following 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita created the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration 
Authority (CPRA) intending to coordinate the activities of the Louisiana Department of 








 Executive Order No. BJ 2008 - 7 
2
 Executive Order No. BJ 2001 - 7 
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Resources (DNR)3.  Before the CPRA was created, the DOTD was responsible for hurricane 
protection (predominately via levee building), and the LDNR was responsible for coastal 
restoration. There was an identified need for increased cooperation between the two 
agencies, but sufficient and necessary incentive did not yet exist to overcome barriers 
preventing a voluntary formal agreement between the two agencies.  Coastal restoration 
and protection projects competed for funds through the same funding processes, on the 
federal level through the Water Resources Development Act and similarly at the state level 
within appropriative committees of the legislature.  The two agencies were not only 
adversarial in terms of funding, but also differed procedurally.   Communication between 
the two was limited.  Talks meant to bring about improved coordination and possible 
merger between the two agencies ended with no finished product largely due to 
disagreement concerning funding.4  
Following the devastating storms of the 2005 hurricane season, preliminary data 
from water gauges were released showing that levees with little to no marsh buffer fared 
much worse than levees with greater area of marsh buffer (Ford, 2007).  Previous studies 
and anecdotal evidence had roughly established that every three miles of wetland buffer 
reduced storm surge by one foot(U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1963), but it was the tragic 








 Revised Statutes 49:213:1-8 
4
 Brad Hanson, Personal Communication; Randy Hanchey, Personal Communication 
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that allowed policy entrepreneurs to take advantage of this reawakened public awareness, 
a newfound sense of urgency and interdependence to overcome previous obstacles to 
collaboration (Weber, 2009). 
The two activities – hurricane protection and coastal restoration – would no longer 
be independently managed.   By September 2005, a bill was introduced to the State 
legislature. In November, the authorizing legislation was passed.  In February 2006, an 
Integrated Planning Team was created to produce a Master Plan that would establish a 
vision of coastal Louisiana realizing four objectives: reduced risk, ensured sustainability, 
protected diversity of habitats, and maintained cultural heritage of coastal communities 
(LCPRA et al., 2006) .  A preliminary report was finished by June 2006 and sent to Congress 
via a US Army Corps preliminary restoration plan in July.  Between July of 2006 and April of 
2007, when the final master plan was submitted to the State legislature, approximately one 
hundred meetings took place in the form of stakeholder workshops, public review 
meetings, and technical review panels.  
The combination of characteristics defining the CPRA such as a large-scale resource 
management collaborative born out of crisis, mandated by the Louisiana legislature, and led 
by an executive office denote certain expected attributes. The CPRA conforms almost 
uniformly to the concept of mandated inter-organizational relations as described by Raelin 
(1980).  The CPRA is the evolutionary product of past interactions between the two 
agencies and has secured permanence by means of statute (Raelin, 1980). Failed talks 
aiming to create collaboration illustrate a limited relationship based on exchange whereby 
the two agencies came together acknowledging the gains to be had through collaboration, 
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but were limited by financial considerations.   Under the CPRA mandate and with the help 
of a consultant, the two agencies constructed a Memorandum of Understanding.   As in an 
exchange network, each agency may choose to leave the network, but according to the 
agreement, only after three years.   There are two subsets of mandated networks as 
described by Raelin (1980).  The CPRA can be said to be a hybrid of the two subsets as a 
formal agreement (subset 1) but also mandated by an external party – the Louisiana 
legislature – creating a legal-political network (subset 2).     
Though the CPRA has inherited technical plans from previous efforts and has already 
adopted two annual plans approving specific projects, anticipating the challenges, and 
opportunities of this new effort is an important step in contributing to this process. To 
determine the optimal structure for and to identify the challenges facing the collaborative 
effort of the CPRA, the state hired the consulting agency, SSA Consultants.  SSA has turned 
to other large-scale resource collaboratives like the California Bay Delta Authority (Cal-Fed), 
the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), the Chesapeake Bay Program (CBP), 
and the Northwest Power and Conservation Council (NPCC) to extract empirical examples of 
challenges and successes that the CPRA will likely face.  Their research suggested a certain 
structure which was used as a starting point for the administration and members of the 
CPRA.        
The difficulties facing the creative body of the CPRA in creating the CPRA were 
described by one member with the analogy, “It feels like we’re building the plane we’re 
flying,” (Slaughter, 2007). This statement echoes what researchers have said about the 
process as well.  Osborne and Gaebler, quoting privatization researcher E.S. Savas, refer to 
 11 
this particular type of multi-tasking by government agencies as attempts by a rower to act 
as coxswain at the same time he or she is rowing (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993).   As Ostrom 
(1990) notes, “Getting the institutions right is a difficult, time-consuming, conflict-ridden 
process.” Those involved in coastal restoration do not yet know where the CPRA mission will 
end or what the future holds for the organization as challenges for its authority become 
apparent.  For example, zoning and planning are essential tools of coastal protection yet the 
authority for these tools lies within municipalities and local governments.  Limits on the 
number of state level departments prevent it from becoming an agency currently, yet after 
the storm more than thirteen constitutional amendments were made. Potential for growth 
looms, yet limited resources and bureaucratic hurdles may prove to be constraining factors.       
Research questions 
This thesis seeks to break ground concerning the study of the collaborative dynamic 
within the CPRA in the hopes that opening discussion will encourage further reflection 
among participants as well as introduce this case to researchers of collaborative 
governance. In particular, the thesis examines two questions:    
1. How is the CPRA unique?   
2. What challenges and opportunities does it face?     
By defining characteristics of this latest coastal management effort that set it apart 
from previous state coastal management efforts and other examples of large-scale 
collaborative governance processes, this thesis also reveals commonalities.   Adding one 
new data point to the field of collaborative governance that describes the observed and 
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anticipated challenges and opportunities of this new formation will hopefully inform future 
efforts.   
Interviews were carried out in September and October of 2008 during the month 
following Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, therefore the number of participants may have been 
negatively affected as potential participants were less accessible.  The scope of this study 
does not include the structure of the CPRA and no attempt will be made to address the 
changing nature of the division positions within this new office.  The OCPR was not created 
until July of 2009, well after interviews had already taken place.  The changing nature of the 
organizational structure and relationship of the CPRA and the OCPR, challenged long-
distance observation.  Positions in the organization continue to be added as its 
responsibilities grow.    
Methods 
 A rapid appraisal method was used in order to maintain pace with the urgency 
driving decisions at the state and local level as well as to capture unforseeable perspectives.  
The form of rapid appraisal method chosen, key informant interviews, involves conversing 
with individuals extremely knowledgeable on a topic in order to provide a quickly obtained 
but relatively “in-depth understanding of complex systems or processes” while also 
capturing “new ideas and issues that may not [be] anticipated,” (Kumar, 1986).   Key 
informant interviews are especially useful when there is a need to understand “motivation, 
behavior, and perspectives” (Kumar, 1986). 
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  Key informant interviews with sixteen individuals from participating organizations 
were held over the phone and lasted anywhere from thirty minutes to three hours. Five 
open-ended questions were asked and (See Appendix A). Interviewees were chosen based 
on their strategic involvement with the coastal restoration and protection framework.  
Chosen individuals received a recruitment email describing the study and asking for their 
participation.  Fifteen of thirty-two individuals contacted consented to an interview – a 
forty-seven percent response rate.    Several times an individual declined to participate but 
suggested another individual within the division to participate.  If a participant seemed 
particularly helpful and interested in the study then the researcher would ask for names of 
other persons the participant thought might be informative.  Recruitment then followed the 
same procedure as described above.  Calls were recorded with permission of the 
participant, transcribed and coded using qualitative research software.   
Given the small community, the decision was made to not attribute quotes taken 
from these interviews as they were used only to illustrate generalized concepts, and not to 
single out the speaker.  All but one participant, Senator Reggie Dupres, preferred anonymity 
in the final publication.  In addition, informants were provided with excerpts from their 
interview to be potentially used.  Written feedback was then requested and incorporated 
into the final document.  
Although the DOTD offices concerning coastal protection were smaller than the 
relevant DNR offices and thus provided fewer personnel to the OCPR, the DOTD perspective 
was nevertheless under served, providing only two participants out of fifteen.    
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Outline of thesis 
This thesis is organized into the following five chapters: 
Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the critical nature of Louisiana coastal wetland loss and 
the decision to create a restoration framework that included levee building and 
other protection measures.  Furthermore, the trend and significance of collaborative 
governance is highlighted before describing how the devastation of the 2005 storm 
season provided the impetus to overcome barriers to following this trend in 
Louisiana coastal management and continues to provide a sense of urgency that 
fuels decision-making at the state level.     
Chapter 2 provides background understanding and is divided into three parts: resource 
characteristics, decision-maker perspectives, and the evolution towards increased 
collaboration across both state and federal agencies to manage Louisiana coastal 
resources.  Part one describes the geophysical aspect of coastal Louisiana, the 
populations who live there, and their use of coastal wetland resources. It also 
outlines the causes and impacts of coastal wetland loss.   Part Two describes the five 
central  perspectives examined in this paper: the Governor’s office, levee districts, 
the Department of Natural Resources, the Department of Transportation and 
Development, and the Army Corps of Engineers.  Finally, Part Three follows the 
chronological sequence of coastal policies that have modified agency interactions 
and authority since 1972, the year of the first state Coastal Zone Management Act.   
Chapter 3 describes the unique characteristics of the CPRA.  Initiated by crisis, the CPRA 
has built on increased public awareness at both the state and national level which 
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has led to an increase in political support and funding.   Strong executive level 
leadership has facilitated an increase in coordination between multiple levels of 
government and improved consistency. These conditions, in addition to the coupling 
of protection and restoration measures, have made what is essentially the return to 
a previous restoration framework, Coastal 2050, a truly unique venture.    
Chapter 4 examines the challenges and opportunities facing the CPRA.   These include 
various aspects of building state capacity and maintaining focus and momentum.   
The newly established  OCPR, not yet operating at full capacity, has the potential to 
build capabilities in planning and management of restoration and protection 
features that rival if not supercede the work of the Corps.  Yet, funding constraints 
tie state activity firmly to the institution and the congressional funding process 
through the Water Resources Development Act.  Challenging the continued success 
of the organization is the state’s ability to maintain focus and momentum over time 
in face of changing administrations both nationally and at the state level, short 
memory of the public and special interests, as well as managing controversial 
components of previous plans.      
Finally, Chapter 5 presents Discussion and Conclusions. There are many years of learning 
ahead of the CPRA.  Learning comes from making mistakes, recognizing connections, 
observing others, and responding to abrupt changes in the system, such as the 
inevitable disaster.  In order to maintain momentum and stay on task, the CPRA 
must show bold and decisive action with clarity of purpose.  It must not get bogged 
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down with imposed bureaucracy stemming from working with the Corps, accepting 
support from the CEQ, and collaborating with similar initiatives.       
 17 
CHAPTER 2:  BACKGROUND 
Resource characteristics, decision-maker perspectives, and the evolution of coastal 
restoration frameworks provide a rich backdrop for the dynamic restructuring occurring in 
Louisiana state government today .  Part One of this chapter describes the geophysical 
aspects of coastal Louisiana, the populations that live there, and their use of coastal 
wetland resources. It also outlines the causes and impacts of coastal wetland loss.   Part 
Two describes the five central perspectives examined in this paper: the Governor’s office, 
levee districts, the Department of Natural Resources, the Department of Transportation and 
Development, and the Army Corps of Engineers.  Finally, Part Three follows the 
chronological sequence of coastal policies that have modified agency interactions and 
authority since 1972, the year of the first state Coastal Zone Management Act.   
Resource Characteristics 
 In the dynamic landscape that is Coastal Louisiana, the interface between fresh 
water from the Mississippi River and the saline water of the Gulf of Mexico create distinct 
vegetative communities.  The sediment carried by flows originating as far north as Canada 
can create shoals blocking river traffic in as little as a day, and build deltaic lobes and barrier 
islands that come and go across geologic time scales.  Almost half of the state’s population 
lives in this ever changing landscape living off of its productivity and creating a unique 
cultural identity.  This landscape is slowly disappearing, taking along with it the livelihoods it 
once supported and changing the population culturally.  The shipping and energy 
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infrastructure that facilitates transport of cheap bulk commodities and provides oil and 
natural gas to the rest of the nation is in peril.     
Coastal Louisiana: “Less a place than a process”   
 
The Louisiana coastal zone covers 14,913 square miles, of which 6,737 square miles 
is open water and 8,176 square miles is land5  (LDNR, 2008).  These wetlands are not 
uniform but exhibit an array of vegetative communities following the salinity gradient 
inward from the gulf.  
 “In geologic terms, [coastal Louisiana] is less a place than a process” (Davis, 2008). 
The coastal plains of Louisiana stretch from its border with Mississippi to its border with 
Texas and can be broadly divided into two geomorphic types. The deltaic plain to the South 
East was built by sedimentation from the Mississippi River (Figure 1).  The chenier plain to 
the west is a series of beach-ridge complexes paralleling the Gulf of Mexico’s shoreline built 
by coastal depositional processes using littoral drift of sediment deposited by the 
Mississippi River to the east (Figure 1).  Land considered uplands today was at one time 
formed by deltaic processes.  Pleistocene terraces, the land behind these coastal plains, are 
downward slanting plains originating from the interface of sea and river as glacier size and 








 Water is typically classified as area having no permanent vegetation.  Floating vegetation is counted towards 
water area, not land area.  Permanent vegetation, meaning vegetation attached to substrate, as in a marsh, is 




Figure 1: Geomorphic Landscape of Louisiana  
The Deltaic plain can be further divided into lobes that over the past 6,000 years 
were each created by a different path of the Mississippi River as it sought a steeper, more 
direct route to the Gulf of Mexico (Figure 2).  Recent research suggests that processes that 
formed the ridge complexes to the west may be more complex than originally thought and 
therefore may be distinguished according to their formative processes (R. A. McBride, 
Taylor, & Byrnes, 2007). 
The processes that created the existing coastal plains are still at work on the 
landscape today though at times with the intervention of human engineering.  The 
Mississippi may no longer seek a shorter and steeper path to the gulf at the expense of the 
economically and culturally important port cities residing on its banks.  A control structure 
maintains a flow rate of 70/30 between its existing route and the path of the distributary it 
would tend to follow in the absence of such control measures.   In the Chenier plain, efforts 
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to control depositional processes include but are not limited to jetties, berms, and beach 
nourishment.   
 
 Figure 2: Deltaic Lobes of the Mississippi River 
 
Concept of a “Working Coast6” 
 
When you start to frame your work, you need to frame it in the context of 
Louisiana’s landscape, which is not Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 








 John Hannavy in his work Britain's Working Coast in Victorian and Edwardian Times gives a description of the 
English working coast that could also be said to describe the Louisiana coast.  “The coastline of Victorian and 
Edwardian Britain provided beauty, isolation, entertainment, and the venue for most people's holidays. But it 
was also a thriving center of industry - shipbuilding and fishing, plus the numerous trades associated with 
dockyards, coastal transport and the leisure industry;” For more on Louisiana as a working coast, see Gramling 
and Hagelman, 2005. A Working Coast: People in Louisiana Wetlands.  Journal of Coastal Research, SI(44), 112-
133.   
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is lapping against a nice pretty beach.  There’s this concept that we’re all 
living in the marsh, and that's not true either. — Participant 
 
Unlike Florida, Coastal Louisiana is not a condo coast.  There are no white sand 
beaches and rows of hotels lining the beach boulevard.  It is a working coast and between 
“solid” ground and the Gulf lie miles of salt marsh, then brackish marsh, intermediate 
marsh, then fresh water marsh.  In such a landscape, it is difficult to compartmentalize the 
pristine from the lived in.  Louisiana coastal wetlands provide fur, subsistence, sport, and 
commercial fisheries.  Hunting expenditures in the state totaled 599 million dollars 
(Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, 2005).  The 2005-2006 fur harvest from 
coastal wetlands generated 1.17 million dollars (Louisiana Department of Wildlife and 
Fisheries, 2006). The 2005-2006 alligator harvest generated 38 million dollars (Louisiana 
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, 2005).  The largest commercial shrimp, oyster, and 
blue crab fisheries in the nation are located here and account for twenty-six percent of total 
commercial landings by weight – excluding oysters - in the lower forty-eight states (National 
Marine Fisheries Service, 2005).  
Wetlands provide the state with flood protection from both inland sources such as 
the Mississippi River and from the Gulf of Mexico.  These wetlands protect valuable 
shipping and energy related infrastructure.  Five of the fifteen busiest ports in the U.S. by 
tonnage are located in southern Louisiana and handle approximately twenty percent of the 
nation’s total waterborne commerce (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2003).  More than 80% 
of the nation’s offshore oil and gas is produced off Louisiana’s coastline and 25% of foreign 
and domestic oil meant for domestic use comes through its ports (Louisiana Coastal 
Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Task Force, 2003).  This could have changed had an 
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end to an off-shore drilling moratorium not been recently  renewed in 2010 following the 
landmark explosion and oil spill at the Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico.  Given 
the severity of the spill, an end to this moratorium does not seem likely any time soon.    As 
of 2007, including Outer Continental Shelf production, Louisiana ranks first out of fifty states 
in crude oil production and second in natural gas.  Excluding Outer Continental Shelf 
production, Louisiana ranks fourth in the production of crude oil and fifth in the production 
of natural gas (Technology Assessment Division, 2008).  As one participant put it, “Two-
thirds of our Gross State Product comes from below I-10”.    
Population 
We need to meet an ever greater challenge, not just restoring sustainability 
to the ecosystem, but to the communities and the cultures that are so unique 
to Louisiana.  That’s the wrinkle that really distinguishes our challenges from 
some of those other efforts. — Participant   
 
Post-storm in 2006, over two million people, a little less than half of the state’s 
population, lived in the 20 coastal parishes that make up Coastal Louisiana (LDNR, 2008).  
Sixty-four percent of Louisiana’s population growth between 1990 and 1997 occurred in the 
coastal parishes (Coast 2050).  About half of this population lived within the deltaic plains 
(Coast 2050).  Prior to the storm, Louisiana had the highest nativity rate in the nation at 
79.4% (Census Bureau, 2000).   
 
Resource problems 
There are many problems associated with coastal wetland loss.   Oil, gas, and 
shipping infrastructure are made more vulnerable to hurricanes.  In addition to becoming 
more vulnerable, coastal communities are losing vital sources of revenue, means of 
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subsistence, and the very ground upon which they stand.  Commercial fisheries have seen 
declines due to habitat loss.  Even seemingly non-related sectors bear the cost of land loss.  
When saline storm surges reach inland, declines in agricultural production occur (Louisiana 
Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Task Force & Wetlands Conservation and 
Restoration Authority, 1998).  For example, declines in Gulf menhaden catch destined for 
the fishmeal market may alter the costs of chicken, salmon, and dog food as these buyers 
are forced into finding alternatives.    
 
Identified causes of problems 
 
Major causes of land loss include barrier island degradation, storms, saltwater 
intrusion, canals, oil and gas development, levee systems, sediment reduction, sea level 
rise, and subsidence.   Climate change has made seasonal storms more severe and the Gulf 
waters warmer causing their expansion resulting in sea level rise (Emanuel, 2005).  
Channeling and leveeing of the Mississippi River has prevented delivery of sediment to 
marshes prone to natural subsidence as the organic soils supporting them decompose and 
compact (Templet & Meyer-Arendt, 1988).  Upriver damming of the Mississippi River has 
reduced the sediment load carried by its waters such that even if the state were able to 
harness one hundred percent of diversions for restoration projects, the sediment load still 
would not be adequate to restore the coast (Blum & Roberts, 2009).  
Indicators of Problem Severity 
Relative to other large-scale collaborative initiatives, the CPRA serves a smaller 
immediate population and is more limited in geographic extent (Heikkila & Gerlak, 2005).   
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The effects of this wetland loss, however, may be felt through the country with increasing 
costs to the nation in fuel prices and the cost of shipping commodities.  The Federal Trade 
Commission places responsibility for an average fifty cent rise in gasoline after Katrina 
compounded by another twenty cent rise after Rita (Federal Trade Commission, 2006)7.  
The inability of goods to pass through the coastal Louisiana port system has consequences 
for commodities markets. For example, New Orleans is a major center of coffee bean 
imports and roasting and stores approximately one sixth of U.S. coffee stores.  The fear that 
the amount of coffee stored in New Orleans was destroyed by Hurricane Katrina was linked 
to an increase of the price of coffee by 5-7% on the New York Stock Exchange in the days 
after the storm ("Katrina's Impact on the U.S. Economy," 2005).  These prices immediately 
fell, because the warehouses of coffee beans, on high ground next to the river, were 
untouched.     
 
Perspectives 
A majority of participants interviewed represented more than one perspective. Six 
participants represented three or more perspectives, five represented two or more, and 








 Market reactions that cause this include energy firms diverting supply from lower-priced areas to higher 
priced areas, firms drawing down their inventories, refineries not affected by the hurricanes increasing output, 
and the importation of gasoline increasing (Federal Trade Commission, 2006). 
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Governor’s Office of Coastal Activities.   The Governor’s Office of Coastal Activities 
(GOCA) is led by the Executive Assistant to the Governor. Within GOCA is the Governor’s 
Advisory Commission (GAC) advisor to the Governor and forum for the various interests of 
its members.  The Advisory Commission is currently made up of 36 members serving four-
year terms representing the following sectors: academic, non-profit, business/industrial, 
conservation, energy, political subdivisions of the states (parishes and municipalities), 
commercial fishing, recreational fishing, oyster industry, coastal landowners, ports and 
related industries, maritime industry, the chairmen of state and house related committees 
and, finally, six at-large members appointed by the governor.  Three of these members - the 
chairmen of house and senate committees on transportation and development and the 
maritime representative - were added following Katrina.  In addition, either the Governor or 
the Commission can invite federal agency members to act as non-voting members.  
Administrative duties related to the function of the Commission are carried out by GOCA.  
Members are compensated for travel expenses and meals at the state employee rate but 
otherwise are not paid.     
Before the storms of 2005, the Advisory Commission’s primary role was as advisor 
and mediator.  The Advisory Commission’s responsibilities included advising the Executive 
Assistant and the Governor on the status and direction of coastal restoration, providing a 
forum for the exchange of information among interests, fostering cooperation among 
various interests, foreseeing and taking action to avoid conflict.  Periodically it would review 
aspects of the coastal restoration program as it saw fit and yearly would provide a report 
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acknowledging progress, identifying challenges and making recommendations.   In general, 
the Advisory Commission provided continuity among gubernatorial administrations8.  
With the inception of the CPRA, the advisory commission has refocused its energies 
as many of its former duties and operations are now carried out by the Office of Coastal 
Protection and Restoration, the implementing arm of the CPRA.  Members of the 
Commission have stated that they see themselves as high level advocates now in the CPRA 
process with direct access to CPRA’s executive leadership (Slaughter, 2007).   
Department of Natural Resources.   Before the creation of the CPRA, the Office of 
Coastal Restoration and Management was responsible for creation and implementation of a 
master plan to maintain, conserve, and protect the state's coastal wetlands. Within the 
Office of Coastal Restoration and Management were the Divisions of Coastal Restoration, 
Engineering, and Management.  The Coastal Restoration and Engineering Divisions were 
responsible for project construction. The main function of the Coastal Management Division 
was regulating activity in the coastal zone through issuing coastal use permits.       
Department of Transportation and Development.    Before the storms of 2005, the 
Office of Public Works, Intermodal Transportation, and Hurricane Flood Protection was 
responsible for 2800 miles of navigable waterways, 27 locks, 39 port authorities, 470 dams 
and an offshore oil terminal authority.  The DOTD also served as the quality check for the 








 Act 114, First Extraordinary Session of 2002 Louisiana Legislature; RS49:214.11-2 
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Levee Districts.  Before federal responsibility for a comprehensive levee system 
came about, riverfront property owners were responsible for levee building on their 
respective properties.  The Swamp Land Acts of 1849 and 1850 gave federally owned 
swamp lands to states which then sold the acreage to private landowners who would then 
be responsible for putting the land into production and protecting it with levees.  As a 
means of privatizing levee building, the Acts were counterproductive.  In Louisiana, upwards 
of nine million acres were transferred to private ownership, which simply increased the 
value of land and the size of the population behind a fragile patchwork of levees that would 
repeatedly fail to control the volume of water coming down the Mississippi and its 
tributaries (Colten, 2005).  Levee boards appeared and coevolved starting in the middle to 
late 1800’s as a means of organizing this construction and maintenance of levees (Barry, 
1997; Van Heerden & Bryan, 2006). In 1866, the state began regulating levee construction 
through the Board of Levee Commissioners (Ardoin, 2010).   
The burden of levee building, flood damages, and shipping channel maintenance 
overwhelmed a post-Civil War Delta and drove the state of Louisiana to seek federal 
intervention.  The Civil War devastated poorly constructed levees in Louisiana and 
elsewhere along the Mississippi River, threatening croplands and urban areas (Colten, 2005; 
Kelman, 2003; M. G. McBride & McLaurin, 1995). One Senator is quoted as saying, “Without 
levees, our country is a waste and we are beggars" (M. G. McBride & McLaurin, 1995).   In 
1871, the state contracted levee oversight to a private corporation, the Louisiana Levee 
Company, and funded work through a three-mill tax (Ardoin, 2010).  The Louisiana Levee 
company was abolished and the state returned to the system of levee districts, each lead by 
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a board of commissioners responsible for the levees within its district (Ardoin, 2010).  
Representatives of Louisiana went on a fundraising tour in the North to sell bonds to 
supplement the tax.  Failing to raise funding through the sale of state bonds, Louisiana 
Senators launched a campaign for a federal Mississippi River Commission (M. G. McBride & 
McLaurin, 1995).  The Commission, established in 1879, would oversee levee building along 
the Mississippi River in partnership with the levee boards, not for flood control but for 
purposes of navigation based on the recommendations of the U.S. Levee Commission five 
years prior (Barry, 1997).  The creation of the Mississippi River Commission was the foot in 
the door for federally funded flood control projects.  In 1917 the Ransdell-Humphreys Act 
made levee boards cost-share partners in levee building for flood control along the 
Mississippi River only.  The Jones-Reid Bill or Mississippi Rivers and Tributaries Act in 1928 
finally made levee building with the goal of flood control a federal responsibility tasked to 
the US Army Corps (Corps), though the levee districts were still responsible for purchasing 
rights of way and conducting maintenance.  The 1936 Overton Act reimbursed levee 
districts for purchased rights of way and tasked the Corps with performing cost-benefit 
analyses to determine whether a project should be built (Reuss, 1982; U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 2010).  
 Generally, the Corps builds the levees which the Levee districts then maintain, 
inspect every ninety days, and report semi-annually on the condition of the levee.  The 
Corps inspects these levees once a year and reviews the reports it receives from the district.  
Levee boards have the authority to buy and sell land, to expropriate land as long as the 
owner is compensated at fair market value, and to build and maintain levees and associated 
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drainage projects.  Additionally, they have their own police force and can build and 
maintain recreational facilities on and adjacent to holdings.  These non-flood assets as they 
are called, especially in and around Orleans Parish, drew a fair amount of scrutiny after the 
storm  as they were considered to be not so much income generators for levee projects, but 
distractions from the core mission of the levee districts (Derthick, 2007) 
After the storm flaws in the levee board system became apparent:  ambiguous 
authority and bureaucratic jurisdictions.  Despite the longstanding relationship between 
levee boards and the Corps, confusion and debate existed about exactly which activities are 
the responsibility of the Corps and which are the responsibility of the districts, resulting in 
repair delays and even levee failures (Derthick, 2007; Independent Levee Investigation 
Team, 2006).  In 1880, there were five levee boards.  By 2005 the number had grown to 
twenty-five.  Levee boards are funded by property taxes.  When there are multiple parishes 
in one district, the least contributing member may receive less than what it pays in for 
construction and maintenance activity from the district (Alford, 2006).  There is incentive 
then to break off from the larger district to form a smaller district where one hundred 
percent of monies go back into the parish’s system of protection.  This is exactly what 
happened in the greater metropolitan area of New Orleans.  Before the storm, the single 
system protecting the greater metropolitan area of New Orleans spanned four different 
levee districts as well as several different sewage and water districts managing the pumps.  
After the storm, the state consolidated levee boards with the intention of reducing such 
bureaucratic jurisdictions.  This resulted primarily in the creation of the South East Louisiana 
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Flood Protection Authority and the South West Louisiana Flood Protection Authority which 
span the greater New Orleans Metropolitan area and the downriver system.       
Army Corps of Engineers.  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for 
14,000 miles of the estimated 100,000 miles of levees in the U.S. (U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 2010).  Levees do not have to be built by the Corps to be under its jurisdiction, 
but they must follow through a certification process performed by either a certified 
engineer or a federal agency to receive accreditation.  The Corps requires semi-annual 
reports from the non-federal sponsor (the local levee district) on the inspection, operation, 
and maintenance of the levee (33CFR208_10).  
While working with the Corps has the advantages of federal funding, technical 
assistance, and liability in case of emergency, the length of time it takes for the Corps to 
study and implement a project can be prohibitively long.  While the Corps performs the 
necessary Reconnaissance, Feasibility, and Environmental Impact Statements, the cost of a 
project can escalate over time as energy costs rise and development ensues putting more 
lives and property at risk.  A member of GOCA was quoted as saying "study is often a four-
letter word" to coastal residents waiting on hurricane protection (Buskey, 2008).  A striking  
example is the Morganza-to-the-Gulf project.  The first Reconnaissance Report was 
authorized in 1992.  Almost twenty years later, the Corps has not finished studying the 
project and at current estimates will not reach completion until approximately 2025, 




Table 1.  Estimated cost of Morganza-to-the-Gulf Hurricane Protection Project over time (emphasis on 
structural protection) 
Estimated Cost of Morganza-to-the-Gulf since 2000 
 Year 
Costs 20001 20022 20073 20084 
Total Project 
Cost 
$ 550,000,000.00 $ 680,000,000.00 $ 912,000,000.00 $ 11,000,000,000.00 
Total Federal 
Cost5 
$ 358,000,000.00 $ 442,000,000.00 $ 592,800,000.00 $  7,150,000,000.00 
Total Non-
Federal Cost5 
$ 192,000,000.00 $ 238,000,000.00 $ 319,200,000.00 $ 3,850,000,000.00 
1 
Water Resources and Development Act, 2000 
2 
Chief’s Report. http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/prj/mtog/EAS/Chiefs23Aug02.pdf.  Accessed November 1, 2008. 
3 
Project Fact Sheet. http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/prj/mtog/project_fact_sheet___morganza.asp accessed 
November 1, 2008. 
4 
Numbers are approximate. Buskey, N. “Morganza could cost an ‘impossible’ $10.7 billion”.  Daily Comet.  Tuesday, 
June 17, 2008 
5
 Based on a 35:65 state:federal cost-share 
 
Currently Louisiana is waiting on the results of a study commissioned by Congress to 
analyze various alternatives for coastwide protection and restoration.  Called the Louisiana 
Coastal Protection and Restoration Study (LaCPR), the LaCPR report will provide specific 
guidance on both protecting South Louisiana from storms and restoring the coastal 
wetlands.  The Corps has emphasized that this is only a study, and not a plan.  Whereas a 
plan would indicate a preferred alternative, and the possibility for funding, this study 
merely provides multiple scenarios bolstering manmade structural protection with 
restoration projects.    
Scientific Community.   The scientific community referred to here is made up of 
scientists most closely associated with universities and outside of state and federal 
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agencies.  In March of 2007, scientists and engineers from eight universities sent an open 
letter addressed to then Governor Kathleen Blanco and Army Corps Lieutenant General Carl 
Strock asking for a more active involvement in the planning process as opposed to reactive.  
They also cautioned against over reliance on structural measures (Bart et al., 2007).   
Evolution towards increased state capacity and collaboration across agencies  
Coastal wetland loss as an anthropogenic function became apparent in the 1950’s 
(Britsch & Dunbar, 1993).  Projects instigating the loss were made with the knowledge of 
the local impacts of such loss but were dismissed either because of the abundance of 
wetlands across the landscape or out of narrow economic considerations (CEI, 1984 p. 24).  
Coordinated restoration efforts did not start until after the first of a series of mapping 
projects quantified the extent of the loss (Gagliano, 1970).  Completed in 1973, a total of 18 
reports examined coastal area trends, identified causes both natural and anthropogenic of 
land loss, and provided management recommendations in the form of a multi-use 
management plan for fish and wildlife (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2004).  Generalizing 
from these first steps to address land loss, the state response to this problem can be 
characterized as having evolved from narrowly focused resource management to the broad, 
complex orchestration of entities addressing social, economic, and ecological concerns. 
Additionally, it is the state in this last effort which has assumed responsibility for initiating 
and directing this movement.      
Federal Coastal Zone Management Act, 1972 
The Federal Coastal Zone Management Act was passed in 1972, around the time 
other national environmental legislation was being passed and about the same time coastal 
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land loss was becoming an issue.  Recognizing the impact of competing demands on fragile 
coastal ecosystems its purpose was to minimize their impact by initiating a coastal use 
permitting system.  The Louisiana State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act (Act 
361) was passed in 1978 to regulate the activities that affect wetland loss and allowed 
parishes to apply for their own permitting program. The resulting Louisiana Coastal 
Resources Program (LCRP) became a federally approved coastal zone management program 
in 1980.   
Louisiana Coastal Wetland Conservation and Restoration Management Act 
  
Setting the stage for a federal bill addressing land loss in coastal Louisiana was Act 6 
of the Second Extraordinary Legislative Session of 1989.  Called the Louisiana Coastal 
Wetland Conservation and Restoration Management Act, the bill took several important 
steps towards building state capacity.  It brought the LCRP, Louisiana’s federally approved 
coastal management program under the management of the DNR.  It then tasked the DNR 
with creating a comprehensive coastal restoration plan and created the Coastal Restoration 
Division (CRD) to house the expertise to do so.  It also created a fund, the Wetland 
Conservation and Restoration Fund (Wetland Trust Fund).  Monies for the fund continue to 
accrue from taxes on oil and gas activities and are devoted specifically to CRD projects 
within the comprehensive plan.  It also created a state level authority, the Wetlands 
Conservation and Restoration Authority (WCRA), to oversee the plan.   
Breaux Act (CWPPRA), 1990 
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Within a year, a related federal bill, the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection, and 
Restoration Act (CWPPRA)9, was passed.  It provided for 75/25 federal/state cost sharing.  
Although some of the money is directed towards other states, a majority of the funds – 
created from taxing fishing equipment, motorboats, and engine fuel – is dedicated to 
Louisiana.  The state receives approximately $50 million annually (National Research 
Council, 2005).  Approximately 30% goes towards the National Coastal Wetlands 
Conservation Grant Program and the North American Wetlands Conservation Fund.  The 
other 70% goes towards the Army Corps of Engineers for construction and other associated 
activities in the Louisiana coast.  The Breaux Act, as it is called in Louisiana after its sponsor 
the popular and longtime senator John Breaux, created a state and federal collaborative 
called the Breaux Act Task Force to oversee the development of a comprehensive 
restoration plan.  This plan stipulated that any and all programs affecting coastal wetlands 
would be consistent with its purposes yet gave no procedural guidance on how to do so and 
was not enforced (Coastal 2050, 1998).     
The model for restoration set by the Breaux Act Task Force continues to be used 
today, amidst some controversy.  Annually, the Breaux Act Task Force submits a Project 
Priority List (PPL) to Congress.  The decision tool used to fund projects involves three steps. 
First, projects are submitted to the Task Force.  Second, Task Force Work Groups then 








 Pronounced “quip-ruh” 
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merit, cost effectiveness, and predicted benefits from stated acreage of wetlands to be 
improved and/or created in addition to their purported quality as determined by the 
Wetland Value Assessment (WVA).  For twenty years from the time of completion, a 
maintenance and monitoring phase commences whereby the realized benefits are 
compared to the predicted benefits.  From 1990 to 2003, 142 projects were approved, and 
68 constructed totaling 218.5 square miles of improved wetlands over twenty to thirty 
years at a cost of 504 million dollars (Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Conservation and 
Restoration Task Force, 2003).   What would have taken the state with its showcase 
restoration program twenty to thirty years to protect, conserve, or restore, hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita would destroy in two weeks. 
 
Coastal 2050, 1998 
By 1997, it became apparent that Breaux Act activities were insufficient to fully 
restore the coast.  Only 25% of the expected coastal wetland loss over the next fifty years 
would have been countered by full implementation of CWPPRA’s projects (U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, 2004).  The Breaux Act Task Force along with the Wetland Authority prepared 
the Coastal 2050 plan aiming to create a still more comprehensive plan for a sustainable 
coast.  It would integrate the comparatively piecemeal lists of projects created by CWPPRA 
into a plan that would reverse the trends of land loss over the next 30 years at an estimated 
total cost of 14 billion dollars, roughly 470 million dollars per year.  
 It also began to look at linkages among coastal activities and sought input from 
stakeholders through 65 regional public meetings gathering input from more than 1,700 
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people.  It highlighted the beneficial use of dredge material, the need to coordinate 
mitigation projects with an overarching restoration plan, providing for the impact of 
diversion projects on communities and oyster leases, the need for and enforcement of wake 
limits in areas sensitive to erosion, improve land rights acquisition procedures, etc.  
Although the Breaux Act had called for programmatic consistency across the board, the 
state still had not acted to ensure this consistently occurred.  At this point in time the local 
New Orleans District of the Army Corps of Engineers began to work with the EPA and the 
FWS to develop interim guidance in addition to working at the level of the Mississippi Valley 
Division to ensure consistency.   
Although Coastal 2050 saw the state establish the groundwork for building state 
capacity, it still relied heavily on federal funding through WRDA and federal technical 
assistance through the Corps of Engineers to implement its restoration plan.  
Louisiana Coastal Area Studies (LCA), 2002 
The drawbacks of relying on federal funding and technical support are epitomized in 
the Corps’ draft LCA Comprehensive Study and its later abbreviated form as the near-term 
LCA study.  The original draft LCA study was the beginning reconnaissance, feasibility, and 
environmental impact studies for the 14 billion dollar long-term restoration plan envisioned 
by Coastal 2050.  The US Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the Bush 
Administration advised the Corps to scale down the draft LCA study and choose only the 
most pressing projects.   This was a setback to Louisiana coastal restoration in at least three 
ways.  First, it cemented the state’s reliance on federal funding and timing.  WRDA 
authorizes but does not fund projects.  Funding comes later through the appropriations 
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process, specifically the Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill. A prior attempt 
by the state in 2000 to gain a fixed source of revenue for its restoration plan through OCS 
funding that would ease its dependence on WRDA had failed.  The state was putting most of 
its eggs in one basket.  Second, it placed Louisiana coastal restoration in competition for 
funding with Florida.   In 2000, the Bush Administration committed to funding a several 
billion dollar Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Project, as a “wetland 
investment…particularly significant to the nation” (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004).    
In the second biennial programmatic review of CERP, reliance on federal funding was one 
factor slowing the process down (Graf et al., 2008).  In its assessment of the Corps’ wetland 
restoration programs in 2004, OMB gave the Corps 17 out of 100 points (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2004).  Louisiana and Florida were competing for funding 
administered by an agency that the Bush Administration rated “ineffective”(U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2004). The third setback to the state was that the LCA study to 
be approved was a return to a technocratic restoration framework with narrowly defined 
goals and projects carried out in isolation without broad public support and involvement 
(National Research Council, 2005).     
CPRA, 2005 
 
“…under governor Mike Foster, I had sort of tried to bring up the idea of a 
state department of water resources which would consolidate these issues.  It 
was ultimately shot down because...of the…political egos of these 
department heads who don't want to give up any of their authority” – State 
Senator Reggie Dupre  
 
The 2005 hurricane season reinforced the importance of comprehensive planning to 
decision-makers and brought back Coastal 2050-like initiatives only with a greater sense of 
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urgency:  regional public meetings, reducing the number of planning units, consolidating 
cumbersome political jurisdictions, building state capacity through strong leadership at the 
executive level and technical expertise, and addressing linkages among coastal activities at 
all possible levels.  Most importantly, it brought the activities of the DNR and the DOTD 
under one roof which would allow the state to act as full partner to the Corps, not just a 
consumer of services.   
To coordinate between the two agencies the legislature expanded upon the duties 
of an existing authority, the Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Authority 
(CWCRA) renaming it the CPRA and adding the element of coastal protection to its oversight 
of the development of a master plan addressing coastal restoration.  Recognizing the 
catastrophic importance of coastal restoration to hurricane protection, the Authority has 
remedied the previously disjointed and counterproductive operations of the two agencies 
by putting the relevant offices under the roof of the Office of Coastal Protection and 
Restoration (OCPR), the implementing arm of the CPRA.  
The original statute passed in 1989, about 16 years previous, reads “efforts by the 
state to address the myriad interrelated problems of coastal land loss have been 
inadequate, fragmented, uncoordinated, and lacking in focus and strong direction.”   The 
goal of the original authority was to strike a “balance between development and 
conservation”(La. R.S. 49:213:1(C)).   Although wetland loss slowed, it did not reverse.  The 
language was vague legislating that “wetlands conservation and restoration be elevated in 
tandem to a position within state government of high visibility and action and … be of high 
priority within that structure” (La. R.S. 49:213:1(D)).  The first published Master Plan quoting 
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Act 8 boasts that it will now, assumedly unlike before, provide “aggressive state leadership 
and direction” (CPRA, 2007, p. 2).  This exact language is not what is original about this bill 
and has been present in the statute since its passage in 1989.  Act 8 created no new funding 
sources for the CPRA.  Expenses incurred by the CPRA were to come from the existing 
Coastal Conservation and Restoration Fund now called the Coastal Protection and 
Restoration Fund (CPRF) in addition to other existing funds for which CPRA now has 
authority.  This begs the question, is the CPRA really heading in a new direction?  What is 
different about the CPRA? What is unique about this effort that makes it not just another 
plan?  How is it more than just a reorganization of offices and a restatement of 
commitment?   These questions will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3:  WHAT MAKES THE CPRA UNIQUE? 
Initiated by CRISIS 
“We felt like we were Chicken Little running around saying the sky is falling 
and now as a result of the hurricanes we now see that the sky has fallen.  
That has done more to bring about awareness than anything.” 
—participant  
 
 To a greater extent than any other large scale resource management effort 
mentioned, the CPRA is a product of Crisis.  With Crisis comes a sense of urgency, now or 
never, a heightened awareness of one’s surroundings that lends itself to great change and 
opportunity to move forward differently than before (Light et al., 1995).  As one participant 
put it, “We'd been saying that Louisiana is losing coastal habitat at an alarming rate and 
nothing meaningful was done until about 1990 when CWPPRA was passed and even that 
was a relatively small amount of money. The big battle has been national recognition of the 
problem and national support for fixing the problem.”  The storm season of 2005 awakened 
the public and decision-makers to the very real consequences of wetland loss: loss of 
homes, livelihoods, and human life.   At the national level, the state has now secured a 
commitment through the Roadmap for Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration in addition to 
funding opportunities that had been limited before.  Already the Obama administration has 
secured 35.6 million dollars for the LCA study and an additional 10 million dollars for 
mapping and restoration of wildlife habitat.   “A huge amount of the coastal restoration 
aspects of the state master plan are essentially an expansion and reiteration of the 2050 
plan with the addition of the coastal protection areas mentioned with more prominence. 
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There really are not a lot of new concepts in the master plan. They’re things that we’ve been 
talking about for years.”  Having acknowledged the problem for decades and incrementally 
building institutional capacity, it was only through crisis that the state was able to secure 
federal support.   
One participant who had been involved in coastal restoration for decades identified 
a cyclical nature of federal involvement, circling between crisis-response by the Corps in 
managing regional water resources, responding to each new crisis in an expansion of 
authority.  Starting in 1927 with the Great Flood where Congress finally authorized the 
Corps to build levees for flood control, then achieving authority for hurricane protection in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Betsy in 1965.  The CPRA is the latest of this institutional 
response to crisis.   
Leadership — One Voice 
One important goal of previous plans that was never achieved is consistency across 
all levels of state government.  Towards this end Governor Jindal passed an Executive Order 
mandating that all levels of state government review their operations to ensure they were 
not working at cross purposes with the master plan.  One participant remarked upon the 
success of this effort, “One of the great things about this is that when someone sees an 
issue…it won't be left on the table unaddressed.”  Individuals working to identify those 
issues are rewarded with further responsibility, “When you complain about something you 
get appointed as chairman.”   The increased coordination between levels of government 
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both horizontally and vertically is mutually reinforcing.   One participant described this 
simple yet profound difference made by CPRA: 
 
“…Having all the decision-makers in one place you don’t have to say, ‘okay, 
let’s go back and see what the coastal zone manager of that parish 
feels’…The state is managing the plan.  We’re truly one sponsor.” 
 
 
Increased coordination between levels of government 
Participants acknowledged increased interaction between different levels of 
government in addition to a turnaround among actors, notably parishes and levee districts.  
A member of the DNR said, “I’ve been involved with restoration for a long time and I’ve 
never had anywhere near this level of contact with the local levee districts, and I think that’s 
a very good thing.”   One participant from the levee district perspective who previously had  
difficulty working with one of the parishes within his district noted with satisfaction that the 
parish leader now signs interagency agreements with the levee district before any project, 
even laying riprap.  Participants from the levee district perspective were also looking 
forward to integrating proposed restoration projects into a larger plan with the potential for 
expanded resources such as technical assistance and funding.  Levee districts are not 
without their own resources, they have the ability to quickly obtain rights of way for 
projects, something that the Corps or the state take longer to do.  The knowledge that a 
project was more than an isolated effort, that it was a piece of a larger network of 
integrated public works made implementation more rewarding. Perhaps this is one of the 
reasons why CPRA members have seen parishes become more aggressive in planning 
restoration projects and coordinating them with the state plan.  One such parish has even 
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begun modeling, and in such a novel way that it has attracted the attention of the state.   
Participants who felt that they did not have a voice before the storm now feel that they are  
part of the process. For example:   
“I sat there at a regular CPRA meeting and listened to this big, bold 
announcement from [the Secretary of the DNR] and Governor Blanco and 
she’s announcing this fantastic project, a diversion project that sits right in 
the middle of a 28 mile levee system that I’m trying to get approval for and 
nobody until that day had spoken to us about it. I looked over at the folks at 
DNR, and I said, ‘nothing personal, but wouldn’t we want to integrate this 
into the levee system that we’re trying to build here?  You may want to put in 
a flood wall. Maybe I can help you acquire land?  Maybe I could provide some 
financial assistance?’ Half of ‘em called me a smart ass, but the next day I 
had half the DNR and the levee district office with their maps telling me 
about this project and trying to figure out how to integrate it.  That’s how 
you’re supposed to do it!  We’re not there yet, but I’ve got plenty more 
examples of how this process is improving.   Had I done the same thing thirty 
years ago, they’d a told me, ‘shut up, --.  You do levees, we’ll do diversions.‘ 
Now when I speak, or the Coalition10 speaks, they gotta listen. That wasn’t 
the case before.”  
 
Strong Leadership within the Governor’s Office 
  
“Back then we sort of envisioned or talked about what back then I can 
remember calling it a coastal czar a person who would answer directly to the 
governor and cut through the red tape and work alongside the federal 
government but again, I think you had what were strong personalities as 
department heads of the DOTD and the DNR. In order to consolidate these 
missions someone has to be able to give up some of their authority and to 










 Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana 
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Advocates of coastal restoration have long identified a need for leadership at the 
executive level to bring together agencies working at cross purposes.  Immediately after the 
storm, talks of an MOU or formal cooperation between the two agencies were attended by 
then governor Kathleen Blanco.  The governor’s office has been instrumental in ensuring 
consistency, supplying resources, and maintaining momentum to get the job done.   
Executive Order #7 issued by Governor Bobby Jindal made coastal restoration priority for 
every state agency, mandating that “all regulatory programs, contracts, grants and all other 
functions vested in them” be consistent with the master plan11. Governor-imposed 
expenditure and hiring freezes affect every department except the CPRA12.   In partnering 
with the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the governor’s office is framing the work to be 
done as a “national emergency” in order to infuse collaboration between it and the Corps 
with a sense of urgency (Governor’s Advisory Commission, 2011).     
 
Reprisal of a Systems Perspective  
One participant encapsulated the core similarities of efforts like CERP, Cal-fed, and 
the Chesapeake by saying, “They’re all interested in big issues and how you engineer a 








 Executive Order No. BJ 2008 - 7 
12
 Executive Order No. BJ 2001 - 7 
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the human component, noting that they were working to sustain not just the ecosystem but 
the communities within, a matter of self-preservation.  For example, one participant 
commented: 
“They are looking at it from the ecosystem restoration perspective with the 
socio-economic on the periphery, and they may argue if you were to talk to 
someone directly involved that point to some degree, but I really believe the 
CPRA master plan brings into the forefront the reality of the situation in that 
this can never go back to a pristine state because we do live and work in the 
coast of Louisiana even more so than people do in the Sacremento-San 
Joaquin Valley area, even more so than people do in the Everglades are even, 
even though people are encroaching more and more into the Everglades.  
From that perspective, we need to meet an ever greater challenge, not just 
restoring sustainability to the ecosystem, but to the communities and the 
cultures that are so unique to Louisiana.  That’s the wrinkle that really 
distinguishes our challenges from some of those other efforts.”   
 
The challenge then is coupling the institution that governs the coastal system with the 
system itself.   
 
Conclusion 
Initiated by crisis, the CPRA has built on increased public awareness at both the state 
and national level which has led to an increase in political support and funding.   Strong 
executive level leadership has facilitated an increase in coordination between multiple 
levels of government and improved consistency. These conditions, in addition to the 
coupling of protection and restoration measures, have made what is essentially the return 
to a previous restoration framework, Coastal 2050, a truly unique venture.    
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CHAPTER 4:  CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
“It’s not the science that’s holding them back or the lack of science.  It’s the 
will to do things, agreement about what needs to be done.  That’s a political 
choice, not a scientific choice.  The whole idea is that we have to reconnect 
the delta to the river, as simple as that.  We want to do it as sustainably as 
possible.  Failing that, then we get some kind of compromise, but it’s all 
political.”  —participant from the scientific community 
 
The various challenges facing the CPRA are all aspects of building state capacity and 
maintaining momentum.   The solutions to these specific challenges are opportunities 
waiting to be realized.  The experience of the Integrated Planning Team in drafting the first 
Master Plan represents the first integration of restoration staff and protection staff.  
Securing billions of dollars from a Congress skeptical of both the state’s efforts and the 
Corps’ ability to restore wetlands while competing with a rival effort for those dollars is no 
small task.  Continuing on with the focus and momentum realized after the storm season of 
2005 is challenged by changing administrations both nationally and at the state level, short 
memory of the public and special interests, operational barriers, and managing 
controversial components of previous plans or legacy issues.  
  
Building State Capacity:  “If the Feds can’t do it, How can we?13”  
There are many elements that comprise state capacity.  One is the ability of 








 (Vigmostad et al., 2005) 
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collaboration between restoration employees and protection employees took place in a 
highly compressed process necessary for the timely creation of the master plan. A limiting 
factor in state capacity is funding which is influenced by relations with Congress and the 
administration in office.  The state cannot generate adequate funds to cover the cost of a 
system-wide coastal protection and restoration plan, and must rely on the federal 
government.  Louisiana was unsuccessful in pushing through a fixed funding mechanism 
with OCS monies while that same year Florida  successfully submitted  CERP, a several 
billion dollar restoration plan through WRDA.  
Integrated Planning Team and the Creation of the Master Plan14 
Before the OCPR was created in 2009, to combine both restoration and protection 
employees, the first episode of collaboration between the two groups besides emergency 
field work during the storm {Katrina?]occurred for the creation of the Master Plan. [this first 
sentence needs help; it is awkwardly written.]  The legislative mandate for the CPRA called 
for a new master plan that took into account the siting of levees as well as the restoration 
of ecological functions.  The Integrated Planning Team (IPT) was the eight person group that 
along with the help of the DNR, the DOTD, and consultants steered the creation of this Plan.  
“[Getting] the right people on the team” was a challenge according to one former member.  
Those chosen to participate had select experience working with others outside their agency.  









the LDNR.  The LDNR houses both engineers and biologists working together to create the 
coastal restoration plan as required by the Breaux Act.  Together they perform Ecological 
Reviews of projects to assess the effects of an engineering project component.  During and 
after the hurricanes, field staff of the LDNR and LDOTD worked together at emergency 
centers and in the field to assess damage to hurricane protection structures.   
Once team members were chosen and seated at the table members of the different 
camps became aware of very real barriers to successful collaboration.  Each side was there, 
because they “all agreed [the plan] was important to...our state’s future” and “all easily 
agreed to the four objectives in the master plan, no problem.”  The difficulty members say 
was that they “had different viewpoints on how to get there.”  Both sides recount the 
difficult process of “two different missions having to learn how to communicate with each 
other.”     
From the LDNR perspective: 
“[we] already felt like we knew what we were doing.  We’d been doing this 
large-scale planning for a while and suddenly we were like, ‘Wait a minute, 
we don’t know what these people are talking about. They’re talking a whole 
different language, and we don’t understand their perspective, and we don’t 
understand things that are important to them to meet their missions and 
agency priority.’   
 
Members spent a little less than a year together creating the plan and learning daily 
to “respect what’s brought to the table by the group” and “get a feel for understanding for 
what are primary and secondary issues.”    Once a member finally interpreted the relative 
priority of issues of other parties at the table, it became a question of “seeing whether 
you’re just holding on to your opinion out of stubbornness and ego and whether you maybe 
need to change, or alter your own expectations.”  The process was short and intense.  “We 
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didn’t have the luxury of saying, ‘we’ll deal with it tomorrow.’ …it was a pressure cooker, 
there’s no doubt about it…daily there was a blowup and having to walk away and cool off 
and come back to work through it….15-20 minutes to an hour later.”        
A public input process was initiated, called “Louisiana Speaks,” that took advantage 
of a post-storm regional planning effort already in place by the Louisiana Recovery 
Authority (LRA).  The name is a reference to the organization “America Speaks” which 
facilitated public input during a three-day long conference two months after the storm to 
create a common vision for rebuilding15 with 150 chosen members of the public from across 
the region plus planning professionals and public officials. Louisiana Speaks continued this 
process by continuing to hold meetings across the region on various topics.  It was at these 
meetings that IPT members found themselves again at odds not only having to explain and 
defend themselves to planning participants from opposite ‘camps’ but with “people who we 
had worked with our whole careers from our individual perspectives from either protection 
or restoration…a hundred people in the room and we’re having these battles and not just 
battling people who are in [opposite camps] but people within your camp.”  It was at these 
meetings that members of the IPT recognized the same learning that was happening within 








 The state was interested in their work after reviewing the planning effort implemented after the September 
11
th
 terrorist attacks in New York City on the World Trade Center towers to determine rebuilding priorities.  
The results of this effort, called, “listening to the city,” convinced the city to scrap the existing plans for 
rebuilding based on diverging interests among city residents as gathered through this process.     
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start to evolve more quickly than others and you would see sort of…people’s consciousness 
expanding…maybe that’s a little too esoteric but it was really happening.”  
Members recalled working long weekdays, over the weekends and through holidays, 
all while getting little to no sleep at times.  IPT members were all quick to point out that the 
Corps’ plan which was slated to come out at the same time as the state plan but on which 
work had already commenced, was not complete at the time the state released its master 
plan.  By completing the master plan in the given time frame, an IPT member said, “It gave 
us the opportunity…to go to Washington with a document in hand and say, ‘Look, Louisiana 
is serious.  We are moving forward with or without…the help of the federal government or 
the ability of the Corps of Engineers to move forward in a timely fashion.  We have chosen to 
take control of our own destiny.’”  The analogue to the IPT within CERP found the same to 
be true.  With a similar crunch upon them, they had buttons printed with their deadline that 
read, “July 99 – Yes We Can” (Vigmostad et al., 2005).  For CERP, meeting that deadline was 
essential for getting federal funding through the 2000 WRDA bill.       
Though not perfect, the plan would, according to one member, “get us to the next 
step” and that “despite our best of intentions, the master plan represents a framework…a 
concept that has a lot more years and a lot more people’s brilliant minds to be dedicated to 
it…to be effective on the ground…But, being able to communicate that to people who hold 
the purse strings in Washington is crucial to get it to work.”    Indeed, the master planning 
process continues each year as an annual plan is passed.   
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Competition with Florida? 
The effort most prominent in participants’ minds was the Comprehensive Everglades 
Restoration Program.    In many participants’ minds, Louisiana had a history of competing 
with Florida for federal dollars.  One reason is that it is the closest large-scale restoration 
effort in proximity, but also in terms of contextual similarities.  Florida has four national 
parks and twenty wildlife refuges, in addition to tens of endangered species (Vigmostad et 
al., 2005).  Louisiana has one National park, twenty National Wildlife Refuges and 
established populations of three endangered species (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service).   
Another reason is that both plans have broadly similar goals such as hydrologic restoration, 
water supply, and sustainability.  At the root of both systems is activity by the Corps of 
Engineers.  In the 1950’s, the Corps delivered the Central and South Florida Project (C&SF) 
re-engineering water flow throughout central and southern Florida for hurricane protection, 
urban and agricultural water supply.  Severe degradation of natural systems at the tip of 
Florida - coral reefs and the Everglades famed “river of grass” - resulted from the lack of 
fresh water and concentrations of pollutants (Douglas, 1986).   The causes of Louisiana’s 
degrading coast are manifold.  Most significantly the Corps’ push to levee the Mississippi 
river to protect communities and agriculture from flooding and the 10,000+ miles of canals 
cut through the marsh for oil and gas exploration done by a billion dollar industry.   The 
Mississippi River freshwater that reaches the marsh has only 30% of the sediment that it 
held prior to substantial damming activities mostly outside of Louisiana’s jurisdiction in the 
Midwestern agricultural region.    
In 2000, both Louisiana and Florida invested heavily in securing federal funding for 
their large-scale restoration plans through Congress. Florida chose to propose one 
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comprehensive program through WRDA while Louisiana proposed to fund its existing state 
program through a funding mechanism within the Conservation and Reinvestment Act 
(CARA).  CARA would have given states with offshore oil and gas drilling annual fixed 
revenue from extraction activities meant to be spent on the environment. This revenue 
would have been direct, meaning that the federal government would have had limited say 
on how Louisiana spent the money before it was spent besides directing it for “the 
environment”.  Louisiana already received royalties, but CARA would have ensured that 
those royalties would have been proportionate with the extraction activity instead of the 
prior arrangement whereby these funds are allocated to all coastal states through an 
application process. Additionally, Congress would not have access to spend this money for 
other purposes or the option to not spend it.  The bill meant to circumvent the costly delays 
that both Florida and Louisiana would eventually encounter by waiting for congressional 
funding for projects through WRDA.  In the end, CERP was approved and the CARA funding 
mechanism was not.  Louisiana went on to follow in CERP’s footsteps by putting forth a 
comprehensive ecosystem restoration plan through WRDA though it is still waiting to see 
any movement.   
Before Hurricane Katrina hit, the state of Louisiana was struggling to pass its near 
term LCA projects through Congress.  One can only speculate as to which pathway for 
federal funding of each state’s restoration plan was more effective in the end.  The crisis 
and later change in administration from Bush to Obama served to help Louisiana secure 
federal funding.  While the change in administration certainly did not harm Florida, it 
certainly did not provide the same benefits as the Bush administration.   The Second 
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Biennial Review of CERP’s progress performed by the independent scientific review panel of 
the National Academy of Sciences in 2008 reads:   
The committee concludes that the CERP is bogged down in budgeting, 
planning, and procedural matters and is making only scant progress toward 
achieving restoration goals. Meanwhile, the ecosystems that the CERP is 
intended to save are in peril, construction costs are escalating, and 
population growth and associated development increasingly make 
accomplishing the goals of the CERP more difficult. Lack of timely restoration 
progress by the CERP, to date, has been largely due to the complex federal 
planning process and the need to resolve conflicts among agencies and 
stakeholders. 
However, future restoration progress is likely to be limited by the availability 
of funding and the current authorization and funding mechanisms. In periods 
of restricted funding and limited capability to move forward on many fronts, 
the ability to set priorities and implement them is critical. Much good science 
has been developed to support the restoration efforts, and the foundations of 
adaptive management have been established to support the CERP. To avert 
further declines, CERP planners should address major project planning and 
authorization hurdles and move forward expeditiously with projects that have 
the most potential for contributing to natural system restoration progress in 
the South Florida ecosystem. 
 
A third biennial review in 2010 echoes the same issues.  The lesson here is two-fold 
and not new.   Vigmostad (2005) in her comparison of seven large-scale restoration 
programs including CERP summarizes “Congress will not write a blank check” and 
“ecosystem restoration plans designed to include federal funds will be unsuccessful if the 
authorized funds are not forthcoming”.  The question then remains, if the federal 
government played a role in creating these problems, how can it provide funding, technical 
expertise, and other resources in a timely manner while satisfying congressional demands 
for transparency and national interest? One funding option for large-scale ecosystem 
restoration efforts like those of CERP, the CPRA, and the Great Lakes is omnibus legislation 
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wherein Congress commits a certain level of investment in these large-scale ecosystems as 
an expression of nation interest.    Another option would be to secure the type of executive 
support that the Gulf Coast has achieved from the Council on Environmental Quality. 
Whatever the solution may be, it may be found sooner if like many parallel technical issues 
facing these ecosystems the issue is addressed by epistemic communities.  .     
Expectations and Distrust 
One aspect of turnover that is widely known is that members of the DOTD who were 
slated to join the OCPR either declined to do so, or made the move only to return to their 
home office a short time later.  Perspective on this differed by whether the participant was 
a member of the OCPR or not and it indicates that the slightest perceived failure - in this 
case the failure of the OCPR to retain its employees – is being scrutinized.  The implications 
for such observation are manifold. One idea which SSA consultants tried to emphasize in 
their work for the state, and it is evident when speaking to members of the OCPR, is that 
mistakes are inevitable and are to be regarded as learning opportunities.  “If you’re not 
making mistakes, you aren’t pushing the envelope” (Slaughter, 2007).  Those outside the 
process may not be receiving this message and may judge more harshly.   
“Some of the people who were slated to come over they either didn't come or 
didn't stay very long.  I'm talking about a fairly small fraction of the 
organization, but we're still working to get up to full strength.  …Some people 
just had problems with change.  Others may have thought that’s really not 
what they wanted to do. We do have a very heavy workload here and 
perhaps they didn't have such a workload where they came from but for 
various reasons they chose not to come, but a vast majority of folks who were 
placed with the organization are still here.” —Participant  
 
Another implication of increased scrutiny is that an unintended lack of transparency 
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could be construed as purposeful and call into question the process.  For example, 
Integrated Planning Team members emphasized the rushed pace and at times contentious 
nature of the planning process.  Some outside the process felt that it was done behind 
closed doors in order to exclude certain segments of the scientific community.     
At a broader level is the issue of Congressional trust.  Casting a shadow over 
Louisiana congressional appeals for a short time and perhaps even still is the Pelican Brief or 
the Hurricane Katrina Disaster Relief and Economic Recovery Act.  The Act presented to 
Congress by junior senators Landrieu (D-LA) and Vitter (R-LA) sought $250 billion dollars in 
addition to the $63 billion dollars already authorized by Congress.  For that price the 
complete roster of Coastal 2050 projects could have been restored 18 times. The Pelican 
Brief would have waived National Environmental Protection Act and Clean Water Act 
provisions for Corps projects in the state as well as eliminated the thirty percent state cost-
share.   
Many times over, high level participants spoke of ways in which the state was 
working to prove its credibility as a recipient of federal funding using as examples the 
success of specific projects such as flood walls in New Orleans holding up against the surges 
of Hurricanes Gustav and Ike.  The letters from Senator Vitter to the Corps also serve in a 
way to provide reason for the state to directly receive money that would otherwise go to 
the Corps by highlighting incidents of misappropriations of funding by the Corps.  In order to 
address congressional limitations, Louisiana has reached out to other states emphasizing 
that the same issues plaguing Louisiana currently could prove potentially troublesome for 
others who rely on the Corps for flood protection (Little Hoover Commission, 2005).  
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Highlighting financial mismanagement, failed levees, skewed cost-benefit analyses, and 
poor performance history in wetland restoration on the part of the Corps is in some way, a 
means of painting the state as a victim of bureaucracy and establishing the case for direct 
federal funding of an established state-implemented restoration and protection program in 
Louisiana.   
“It all comes back to putting the people in charge that you either trust 'em or 
you don't. If you don't trust 'em they don't need to be in those jobs …I've 
never had any problem firing anybody for not performing.  Whether it be a 
consultant that you sign an agreement with or a maintenance worker on the 
levee, you do what you're paid to do or ‘see ya’, ya know?  I understand that 
in the past because of …the political history not the efforts … but our political 
history has been that we've not always done things right.  We've not always 
done things above board.  ‘It's Louisiana, you know’ and I hear that until I'm 
sick of it! At some point in time,…Give Louisiana a chance.  We've got a 
governor, by god, I mean, 200% has talked about ethics and reform and has 
made moves and put people in positions that should be able to do things 
properly.  Trust us! … everyone is willing to accept the compromises here and 
there and at the end of the day they see the greater benefit.  …  Audit my 
books.  I don't care if you look once a week at 'em.  …We've earned where we 
are right now.  We've earned not being trusted and somewhere along the line 
I hope that someone gives us a chance to do it the right way.”    
 
Mass resignations from public boards due to a new ethics law that required full 
disclosure of personal assets may signify that not everyone welcomes audits and increased 
scrutiny (Lundin, 2008).   
Willingness to make Hard Decisions 
A challenge in assuming leadership is having the willingness to make hard political 
decisions.  Participants questioned whether the state would have the fortitude when 
necessary.   Several specific incidents indicated that, as one participant put it, “The jury’s 
still out.”  Statewide minimum zoning standards passed by the legislature soon after Katrina 
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were repealed following appeals by the homebuilder lobby.  One Parish was able to kill a 
significant freshwater diversion project in its jurisdiction because of what they saw as 
adverse impacts.  In a conflict with DNR over a specific project for the beneficial use of 
dredge material, the Corps found a politically influential individual within the maritime 
transportation industry to approach the highest level of state government to say that the 
project would harm the marine transportation industry. As a participant commented, 
“There's a fairly short memory in a number of special interest groups and the public in 
general”.      
Doing Business with the Corps 
 As a consumer of Corps products and services, one of the tasks for the CPRA is to 
negotiate the quality of work within the time frame it desires.  In order to achieve this, the 
state must transition from a mere consumer of Corps services to full partner.  The Corps and 
the state already work very closely through project management plans to allow the state to 
make changes.  The state has several trump cards up its sleeve to guarantee results.  It can 
refuse to provide right of ways for projects, and it can also use the federal consistency 
clause from the CZMA to veto components of a project or a project altogether.  
 Despite these powers, many participants were quick to point out the need for 
improved relations between the Corps and the State.  One participant remarked, “It's not 
like based on the experience we have that we would pick this agency to work with.”  In many 
ways, now that the state is improving its in-house project planning and management 
capabilities within the OCPR, the Corps is becoming a rival institution. Participants spoke of 
the reorganizing of state institutions as “taking control of our destiny,” “taking control of the 
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trajectory of change,” and ultimately that “coastal restoration should be a state 
responsibility carried out with federal funding.”  The Corps was seen as a major roadblock.  
“We can’t save Coastal Louisiana under [Corps oversight].”   “We can’t take control of our 
destiny because of the Corps.”    
 In addition to those categories of challenges, specific incidents were also 
highlighted.  Most recently Louisiana’s junior senator sent a letter to the Commanding 
General of the Corps  to express outrage that slightly more than thirty million dollars in 
2006 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation funds meant for the repair and improvement 
of non-federal levees in Terrebonne Parish two years later still had not been received.  Not 
only had the funds not been received, but the letter alleged that the funds had already been 
spent on a mentoring program with a state university.  The senator claimed that flooding in 
the parish this past storm season could have been prevented had those repairs been made.   
In 2006, there was also the case of faulty pumps purchased through a bidding process that 
was accused of being rigged.  Corps contractors had copied and pasted specifications for 
pumps from a specific firm instead of using specifications required as estimated to do the 
job.  The firm whose specifications were used had already bought the engines used to 
power the pumps before it had won the bid.  In this instance, it does seem that the state is 
willing to step up and put pressure on entities like the Corps regardless of the outfall.  
 The perceived relationship with the Corps seems to be better at the local level, for 
example with members of the Mississippi Valley District headquarters in New Orleans than 
with the Corps at the national level.   “You can either stand up there with me or I can say 
that I did this in spite of the Corps.  This colonel, has accepted that challenge. He's told me, if 
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someone’s holding up your project, you call me. If someone's not cooperating, you call me. 
When I go to the Corps for a meeting, there's thirty people there.  It's crazy that there has to 
be thirty people, but it's 30 people all hearing the same message.”  Ideally the state would 
like an office of Corps members located in house to work solely on Louisiana coastal 
restoration. “We are forming all sorts of partnerships with the corps after Katrina.   That 
relationship is getting somewhat better.  It's not what it needs to be.”    
  
Maintaining Focus and Momentum  
Challenging the continued focus and momentum of the CPRA are changing 
administrations both nationally and at the state level, short memory of the public and 
special interests, operational barriers, and managing controversial components of previous 
plans or legacy issues.        
Changing Administrations, Partisanship, and Public Support 
A unique challenge to mandated collaboratives is sustaining the mandate.  There 
was a desire among participants that the issuing crisis creating the need for collaboration 
would create focus and momentum over the long term, transcending administrations, and 
partisan politics.  The organization has already undergone its first change in administration 
and has fared well.  The mandate for the CPRA was created under the Blanco administration 
in 2005, and by 2007 saw the governorship change hands and parties.  The Governor’s 
Executive Assistant on Coastal Activities, Sidney Coffee, was replaced with Garret Graves, a 
decade long veteran of Congressional committees.  The Governor’s Advisory Commission 
largely stayed the same.   A significant turnover of appointed officials took place.  Of the 
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three members of the existing Executive Implementation team  only one remained after the 
transition.  In fact, the secretary of the DNR was one of only two Secretaries to remain 
under the Jindal administration.  The other was the Secretary of the Department of 
Revenue.  Again in 2008 it seemed there was potential for another change when the 
recently elected governor made the short list for potential vice presidential candidates for 
the Republican Party in the 2008 presidential election.  When asked if this was a concern for 
the CPRA process, participants did not express concern.  One even reported that like other 
colleagues, having a Louisiana governor as vice president might raise Louisiana's issues in 
the next presidential administration16. Participants shared confident optimism that this 
organization will transcend partisan politics over the long term.   
Operational Barriers 
Barriers to operations can be as small as mail servers from different agencies not 
being set up to allow addresses from other agencies to as large as employees of different 
agencies having different requirements and restrictions on the amount of time they can 
work.  Participants reported a number of operational barriers including the previous two 







16 The Democratic winner of the 2008 election, Barack Obama, split what was once a solidly Republican voting bloc in the South - except 
for 1976, 1992 and 1996 when Southern governors Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton won the presidency.  Louisiana's nine electoral votes 
went to John McCain the Republican candidate.  A senior research associate at the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies in 
Washington, said of the new administration, "The South is so out now...[Obama] is not going to have a Southern mentality, and neither is 
anybody around him." "There won't be a bunch of James Carvilles in the White House," in reference to the Louisianian who was President 
Clinton's top strategist in the 1992 campaign. Instead the Chicago consultant, David Axel rod will be "Obama's Carville" who the research 
associate calls -- "an urban guy from the North with an urban Northern guy's sensibilities." (Tilove, November 5, 2008).   
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field staff integration, and turnover.  These challenges all have the potential to aggravate 
the challenge of a heavy workload and a high stress environment, but participants did not 
seem overwhelmed.      
 “In our office we could easily have more staff than what we have now.  
We're addressing that in the next legislative session.  We're going to lay the 
groundwork to get some more positions approved - more personnel and more 
funds.  It's just a small step, but we're getting better as we go. …at some 
point in the future we all kind of agree that this office of coastal protection 
will have to have some higher level agency status, a stand alone agency with 
independent funding instead of an office within another branch of state 
government.”   
 
Prior to the storms of 2005, the LDNR was facing loss of trained staff to the private 
sector and to the Corps which offered better pay and benefits (Slaughter, 2007).  Post-
storm, the creation and elaboration of the OCPR’s duties created more positions than staff 
members available from home agencies.  Budget cuts prompted the Governor to impose a 
halt on agency expenditures.    Although Governor Jindal exempted the OCPR from a hiring 
freeze, allowing it to fill those positions, the state still has to contend with contractors from 
the private sector attempting to lure away trained staff.  Leadership within the OCPR 
recognized that vacancies are prohibiting them from working at full capacity and added to 
the stress and workload of current employees.  They did not however see that filling these 
vacancies would be difficult.  They reasoned that the organization had a lot of pull in terms 
of attracting not only the best and the brightest, but a sufficient quantity of applicants as 
well, particularly with the state of the economy.   
 “Our employees work at a higher pace, quicker and more demand of them 
and we’re not going to settle for people not getting things done and not 
meeting schedules, a different culture than what a lot of people are used to in 
state government.  Some people will leave us, but we’ll get better people to 
fill these positions.  This is one of the biggest civil engineering feats in the 
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world.  There are people around the world who want to work with us just 
because of that. So I think we'll have a motivated group of people who are 
here because they want to work on this project.  Those who are not willing to 
work will leave.” 
 
The very challenges that employees face, are the same opportunities that they look 
forward to.  Participants, after talking about the difficulties of their jobs, would often follow 
up with comments that explained their passion for their work, or how their job satisfied the 
need for an intellectually stimulating environment.  These challenges are not always 
welcomed, “There are some days where I really don't want to fight that battle and other 
days it's like, ‘let's go!’” 
 
Legacy Issues 
The CPRA framework is yet another layer in forty years of coastal restoration efforts. 
Participants in the process have developed a certain callous to previous restoration plans:  
“If we had used all of that paperwork [from previous plans] to rebuild the coast we probably 
would have had it done by now”. Others however emphasize these plans are “additive” and 
acknowledge that today’s efforts have built off of much of the baseline monitoring that was 
done for previous plans. “Why would we throw out what had been good work?” said one 
participant. 
Not all past projects or program features are worth keeping.  What participants 
called “bad projects” have survived,as residuals of previous restoration frameworks that 
either need to be reworked or thrown out altogether.  Many participants thought “good 
science” would address issues of that sort, but then it became clear that the definition of 
good science was not uniform across all participants.  One element of previous restoration 
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frameworks that repeatedly came up is a decision tool developed during the Breaux Act 
used to select projects for the final Project Priority List to be funded by Congress, the 
Wetland Value Assessment (WVA).  
“As used, WVA analysis provides some standard for comparison, but it is not 
a true scientific assessment. Of course those who actually do WVA analysis 
would argue this point, but the fact is best professional judgment – no matter 
how good – is not a data rich, process-based method for analyzing potential 
project benefits. This has been a long-standing point of contention between 
the academic community and the agency personnel who do the work.  One of 
the many purposes of the state’s  newly created Center for Applied 
Engineering and Science is to develop the tools that will allow for a more 
comprehensive, data rigorous method for forecasting not just individual 
project benefits but the basin-wide or even coast-wide benefits of projects 
working together.” –Participant     
 
Every participant who could be described as coming from the scientific community 
perspective and even some agency employees expressed concern that what they saw as a 
“relatively quick qualitative evaluation of project alternatives” was being sold as real 
science.  Said one participant 
 “These are very rudimentary tools. They were developed by the agencies [as] 
decision assistance tools, not science tools.  I helped set that up originally, 
because there were no tools in the early nineties…I always thought it would 
be a stopgap thing…but now it has become enshrined and now it’s almost 
seen as science.  I always thought of it as being a simple comparison tool, but 
it has now taken on a certain religious meaning or something.”  
 
The creation of the WVA is a simplification of Habitat Evaluation Procedures and 
Habitat Suitability Indices that were then modified for coastal habitats. The results are 
extrapolations over time and space that give a rough estimate of the benefits of one project 
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over another.   In one hour, it is estimated that a decision maker can assess one acre of 
habitat.   
Conclusion 
The various challenges and opportunities facing the CPRA are all aspects of building 
state capacity and maintaining momentum.   The experience of the Integrated Planning 
Team in drafting the first Master Plan represents the first steps towards solidifying the 
connection between the coastal restoration perspective and the coastal protection 
perspective.  Funding constraints tie state activity firmly to the congressional funding 
process through the Water Resources Development Act and thus to the Corps.  Securing 
billions of dollars from a Congress skeptical of both the state’s efforts and the Corps’ ability 
to restore wetlands while competing with a rival effort for those dollars is no small task.  
Yet, with these challenges come opportunity.  Congressional funding is added incentive to 
maintain transparency, stay on task, and prove commitment through making politically 
unpalatable decisions.  Both CERP and the CPRA are working on parallel issues, though 
contextually distinct, which may offer opportunities for realizing collaborative advantage.  
Relationships between the relevant decision-makers, not just the scientists need to be 
fostered.  The newly established  OCPR, not yet operating at full capacity, has the potential 
to build capabilities in planning and management of restoration and protection features 
that rival if not supercede the work of the Corps.   
Challenging the continued focus and momentum of the CPRA are changing 
administrations both nationally and at the state level, short memory of the public and 
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special interests, and managing controversial components of previous plans or legacy 
issues. The administrative changes that have taken place occurred fairly early on in the 
process, when a sense of urgency still infused the political process and before the exact 
structure was in place and thus anything to affect.  Time will fade the sense of urgency from 
the public memory and weaken the resolve to refuse acquiescing to special interests.   
Legacy issues continue to divide interests.  The continued use of the WVA, serves as an 





CHAPTER 5:  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis sought to expand knowledge on newly formed large-scale ecosystem 
collaborative governance processes by identifying the unique characteristics of the CPRA 
framework and examining the challenges and opportunities facing policy and project 
implementation within the first few years of its mandate.   
The major hurdles to coastal restoration and protection are political; however they 
are not all what the literature suggests they would be.  While the literature suggests that 
data and technology, disjointed agency workings, and legal authority are the usual 
weaknesses at the state level, this is not the case in Louisiana.  The state has over forty 
years of data collection and technology developed by strong coastal science programs 
within the state university system, and the private sector in the nation’s largest coastal 
laboratory.  By combining the DNR and the DOTD offices under the OCPR, the state has 
addressed disjointed agency workings.  By establishing strong leadership at the executive 
level, it has given itself the legal authority to address inconsistencies at multiple levels of 
government.  The question is whether it will choose to to do so in cases where such action 
is politically unpopular but necessary for the overall goals of the master plan.   
Whereas direct public accountability has been noted as a strength in the state 
management of water resources, in the context of restoration and protection it works to 
stifle necessary but politically unpalatable decisions.  There are many instances where 
restoration and protection techniques create contention.  Levee siting has the potential to 
result in the taking of private property.  Diversions change flow regimes affecting 
 67 
development and alter salinity gradients thus affecting oyster leases and other fisheries.  
Every participant interviewed suggested that at some point the state will need to take 
decisive and bold action to identify which areas will receive what level of protection, the 
idea being that some populations would receive more protection than others and some no 
protection at all.  This triage concept is found in state planning documents, however no 
significant movement has been made in this direction.  Without action, the decision will be 
made for the state by the next disaster.   It is the responsibility of the executive leadership 
to address the great white elephant in the room of restoration and protection.   
There are many similarities between the Coastal 2050 and the CPRA frameworks.  
The initiating crisis that supplied the CPRA with the critical momentum to ensure 
consistency across multiple levels of government and gain necessary national support in 
ways Coastal 2050 efforts were unable to, will eventually fade from memory.  At that point 
in time, without a sense of urgency, a natural tendency toward bureaucracy like that 
experienced by Cal-fed will only be countered by leadership.  Structure and incentive 
provided at the national level by the CEQ’s Roadmap for the Gulf Coast may provide 
leadership or act as another layer of bureaucracy.  It is too early in the process to tell.  One 
certainty for the state is that another disaster will happen.  Since the Civil War, disasters 
have occurred roughly every thirty years:  the Great Flood of 1927, Hurricane Betsy in 1965, 
and Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  It may turn out that yesterday’s solutions are the problems 
future policy makers will have to address.  Instilling an adaptive nature, as the CPRA 
framework has done, is essential to nimbly address future challenges.   
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As other large-scale ecosystem governance structures are established and seek 
federal support, the CERP and CPRA experience with the WRDA funding process indicates 
that a new avenue needs to be created to support those structures nationally.  
Relationships can be fostered among policy makers from different systems now to 
encourage that discussion. Time and continued transparency will work to eliminate the 
distrust at the federal level of Louisiana Congressional appeals for funding.   
Close collaboration with a special in-house office of the Corps may preclude efforts 
to reform the Corps as an institution through Congress, especially if the state continues to 
build its planning and management capabilities.  Relationships developed with the Corps at 
the New Orleans and Mississippi Valley District level seemed more positive than the state’s 
relationship with members of the Corps at the national level.  Unless another path if forged, 
working with the Corps is necessary even if not desired.         
Future Research 
Future research directions suggested by the findings of this thesis include the 
following topics.  Both CERP and CPRA are currently bogged down in the Congressional 
funding and authorization process for their major restoration programs.  Is there value in 
replacing competition with collaboration in going after such funding?  How can similar 
efforts like the Everglades and CPRA work together on a policy level to avoid competition 
for federal dollars or seek other sources of funding?  Do other efforts already exist that can 
highlight the importance of coordination among major restoration programs that allows 
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resource sharing, avoids competition for restoration dollars, and publicizes shared issues 
such as hypoxia?   
Public awareness is one key to public support of large-scale diversions and other 
potentially divisive restoration techniques.  Research has been conducted comparing 
respondents’ comfort level in explaining drivers of coastal wetland loss and methods of 
coastal restoration.  Mail surveys were conducted to compare the upper Mississippi River 
Basin and the Lower Mississippi River Basin.  Studies to assess levels of public awareness 
strictly within Louisiana at the regional level – South versus North, South East versus South 
West – might help public awareness campaigns like America’s Wetland better address 
public knowledge gaps.  A survey of Louisiana residents’ coastal knowledge might help 
assess general awareness of the population served by these projects.     
Considerable change took place in the OCPR structure over the course of three 
years. Why? How?  What was the process by which the structure was decided upon and 
how do members of the CPRA anticipate it changing or evolving over time?  What norms are 
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1.  I find it interesting that many people working within the master planning process have 
worked on many sides of the table.  In order to better understand the perspective 
that you bring to the table, I’d like to know your education and work history. Could 
you summarize for me any education or professional training you’ve had and what 
jobs you’ve held leading up to your current position?  
 
 2.  Cal-Fed, Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Program, and the Chesapeake Bay 
Program are all efforts that have been compared to the LCPRA. Are you familiar with 
these efforts and do you think this is a fair comparison?   How is the LCPRA similar 
and/or different and why? 
 
3.  Prior to the current master planning process were Louisiana’s Coastal Zone Management 
Program, CWPPRA, Coastal 2050, and the LCA study.  This is not a complete list by 
any means, but generally speaking, each of these was an attempt to be more 
comprehensive than the restoration process that preceded it.  What sets the CPRA 
apart from its predecessors is that it integrates the siting and implementation of 
coastal restoration features with that of protection features.  It also attempts to 
coordinate among a number of different entities to a level unattained by previous 
efforts. Can you think of any other ways that the LCPRA is different from previous 
restoration plans?   
 
4.   I am interested in how the master planning process is influenced by the challenges it 
faces and how it may create challenges.  I’d like to talk some about the challenges 
that [YOUR ORGANIZATION] has had to face with implementation of the master plan 
and what challenges may exist in *YOUR ORGANIZATION’S+ future in working the 
implementation of the master plan.  What were some challenges that [YOUR 
ORGANIZATION] had to address after the inception of the master plan? 
 
5.   Can you think of any opportunities that [YOUR ORGANIZATION] has been able to take 
advantage of since its inception?  Can you think of any opportunities that [YOUR 
ORGANIZATION+ might take advantage of in the future that it hasn’t been able to yet?  
  
 
 
 
 
